Optimality analysis has recently been proposed for value-based decision-making, in which 6 decision agents are rewarded by the value of the selected option. This contrasts with psy-7 chophysics where decision agents are typically rewarded only if they choose the 'correct' 8 or best option. The analysis of optimal policies for value-based decisions raises interesting 9 and surprising parallels with decision rules proposed for accuracy-based decisions in binary 10 and multi-alternative cases, and explains experimentally-observed deviations from ratio-11 nality. However, the analysis assumes that decision agents should treat time as a linear 12 cost, and thus optimise their Bayes Risk from decisions. A more naturalistic assumption 13 is that future rewards are geometrically discounted, since they are less likely to be realised 14 in an uncertain world. Changing the way in which time is costed leads to substantive 15 changes in the resulting optimal policies, explains empirical data that previously could not 16 be explained, and makes falsifiable predictions for future experiments. 19 algorithms for typical decision problems can provide great insight. This normative ap-20 proach can explain observed behaviours, and predict new behavioural patterns, based on 21 evolutionary advantage. Yet the assumptions underlying such model analyses can prove 22 crucial. In a recent article Tajima and colleagues ask what optimal decision algorithms 23 107 Bayes Risk, in the multi-alternative case preliminary exploration suggests that the same 108 phenomenon is explained only by geometric discounting of future rewards (Fig. 1D) and not 109 by nonlinear utility, at least for plausible nonlinear functions examined (see Supplementary 110 Data). If generally true, magnitude-sensitive reaction times could thus falsify the Bayes 111 Risk-optimisation account of behaviour, and further theoretical and empirical investigation 112 into this would seem merited; if the analysis of [Tajima et al., 2019] showing magnitude-113 insensitive boundaries for linear utility and Bayes Risk-optimisation could be extended to 114 determine conditions for utility functions to lead to magnitude-insensitivity, for example, 115 this would be of great interest. 116 Optimal Policies. The Drift-Diffusion Model optimises speed-accuracy trade-offs [Bogacz et al., 2006] 117 yet has been criticised as being not generally applicable to value-based decisions [Pirrone et al., 2014]. 118 Thus it is surprising when the optimal policy for value-based decisions is realised by a 119 drift-diffusion process with collapsing thresholds [Tajima et al., 2016]. Here we have seen 120 that with geometric discounting of future rewards the drift-diffusion model with collapsing 121 bounds is not the optimal policy.
Introduction 18
In understanding the brain, which is a product of evolution, searching for optimal 1 look like for multi-alternative value-based choices, in which subjects are rewarded not by 24 whether their decision was correct or not, but by the value to them of the selected op-25 tion [Tajima et al., 2019] . The resulting algorithms correspond to earlier simple models 26 for perceptual and value-based decision-making. Tajima et al.'s findings, however, rest on 27 an assumption that time is a linear cost for subjects. When, as is more appropriate for 28 naturalistic decisions, subjects discount rewards more the further into the future they will 29 occur, optimal decision algorithms change qualitatively. These changes are consistent with 30 recent empirical data that cannot be explained by analysis based solely on a linear cost of 31 time.
32
In analysing multi-alternative value-based decision-making, Tajima et al. build on their 33 earlier work in optimal decision policies for binary value-based choices [Tajima et al., 2016] . 34 Through sophisticated analysis based on the standard tool for solving such decision prob- 35 lems, stochastic dynamic programming [Mangel and Clark, 1988, Houston and McNamara, 1999] , 36 the authors also seek neurally-plausible decision mechanisms that may implement or ap-37 proximate the optimal decision policies [Tajima et al., 2016 , Tajima et al., 2019 . These 38 policies turn out at their simplest to be described by rather simple and well-known de-39 cision mechanisms, such as drift-diffusion models with decision thresholds that collapse 40 over time for the binary case [Tajima et al., 2016] , and nonlinear time-varying thresholds 41 that interpolate between best-vs-average and best-vs-next in the multi-alternative case 42 [Tajima et al., 2019] .
43

Results
44
The purpose of this commentary is not to criticise the methods used by Tajima and 45 colleagues, which are standard, or the analyses, which are elegant. Rather, the pur- Bogacz et al., 2006 , Pirrone et al., 2014 . For a lab subject in a pre-defined and known 52 experimental design this may appear appropriate, for example because there may be a fixed 53 time duration within which a number of decision trials will occur. However, an alternative 54 and standard formulation of the Bellman equation, the central equation in constructing a 55 dynamic programme, accounts for the cost of time by discounting future rewards geomet-56 rically, so a reward one time step in the future is discounted by rate γ < 1, two time steps 57 in the future by γ 2 , and so on (see Supplementary Data ). This is a standard assumption 58 in behavioural ecology [Mangel and Clark, 1988, Houston and McNamara, 1999] , in which 59 discounting the future means that future rewards are not guaranteed but are uncertain, due 60 to factors such as interruption, consumption of a food item by a competitor, mortality, and 61 so on. Thus discounting the future represents the inherent uncertainty that animals must 62 make decisions under in their natural environments, in which their brains evolved. The ap-63 propriate discount is then the probability that future rewards are realised, hence geometric 64 discounting is optimal since probabilities multiply. Indeed there is extensive evidence of 65 such reward discounting in humans and other animals (e.g. [Sellitto et al., 2010] , although 66 this frequently suggests hyperbolic rather than geometric discounting, a fact that in itself 67 merits an explanation based on optimality theory [McNamara and Houston, 2009] ).
68
In the following I show sample optimal policies for single-trial decisions when the change 69 is made from linear costing of time, or Bayes Risk, to geometric discounting of future 70 reward. In the binary case decision boundaries become non-linear ( Fig. 1A to B ), and Fig. 6d ), yet under geometric discounting, non-linear decision thresh-74 olds are inevitable even for linear subjective utility. Note that geometric discounting of future rewards is similar to, but not the same as, non-linear utility. In the multi-alternative 76 case, on the other hand, the picture is more nuanced; moving from linear costing of time 77 to geometric discounting of future rewards changes complicated time-dependent non-linear 78 decision thresholds (Fig. 1C , [Tajima et al., 2019] Fig. 7 ) into either simple linear ones that 79 collapse over time for lower-value option sets (Fig. 1D ), or nonlinear boundaries that evolve the 'best-vs-average' decision strategy, whereas the more complex boundaries interpolate 83 between 'best-vs-average' and 'best-vs-next' decision strategies [Tajima et al., 2019] .
84
Changing the optimal policy has consequences for optimality explanations of observed distributions over repeated trials [Tajima et al., 2016] . The latter can be discounted as 94 single trial experiments also exhibit magnitude-sensitivity [Pirrone et al., 2018b] , leaving 95 saturating utility and discounting of the future as the principal remaining explanations.
96
Distinguishing these empirically may be hard since singly or jointly they give rise to qual-97 itatively very similar predictions (see Supplementary Data) . Figure 1 . Optimal policies for value-based decision-making specifying when to choose options or continue accumulating evidence. A) For binary decisions with linear subjective utility, the optimal policy to maximise expected reward is a drift-diffusion model with time-collapsing boundaries [Tajima et al., 2016 , Tajima et al., 2019 . This policy cannot explain observations of magnitude-sensitive reaction times, such as decisions between equal-but-low-value options (circle) being made faster than equal-but-highvalue options (star) [Pirrone et al., 2018a] ; this is because the decisionboundaries of the optimal policy have slope 1 in expected reward space r = (r 1 ,r 2 ), and true values for equal alternative decision pairs all lie on the line with slope 1, hence collapsing decision boundaries will intersect with both low-value and high-value pairs at the same time on average. B) In contrast, for binary linear utility decisions with geometric discounting of future rewards the optimal policy realises non-linear decision boundaries that 'zip' together (see Materials and Methods and Supplementary Data); such a policy can explain observed reaction time patterns as equal-but-high-value decision options (star) will be spontaneously chosen between. C) For multialternative decisions with linear utility, the optimal Bayes Risk-optimising policy exhibits time-dependent decision boundaries in the estimate space r = (r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ); over time these boundaries interpolate between best-versusaverage and best-versus-next decision strategies [Tajima et al., 2019] . D) In contrast, for multi-alternative decisions with linear utility, the optimal policy that maximises geometrically-discounted future rewards can exhibit simple linear decision boundaries that collapse over time for low-value option sets, corresponding to the best-versus-average decision strategy, or exhibit decision boundary dynamics more similar to the Bayes Risk-optimising strategy, in the case of high-value option sets (see Supplementary Data) . As in the binary case, unlike the Bayes Risk-optimising strategy, maximisation of geometrically-discounted rewards predicts differing reaction times for equal-but-low-value decision option sets (circle), and equal-but-high-value decision options (star) due to faster collapse of decision boundaries in the latter case (see Supplementary Data) . the Bayes Risk optimal policy is approximated by a neural model that is consistent with 103 observations of economic irrationality [Tajima et al., 2019] , hence it will be important to 104 see if a revised neural model based on the revised optimal policy still shows such agreement.
105
For example, while in the binary case magnitude-sensitive reaction times can be explained 106 both by nonlinear subjective utility functions, and by geometric discounting rather than [Bogacz et al., 2006 ] Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., and Cohen, J. D. (2006) . The physics 148 of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice 
164
Evidence for the speed-value trade-off: Human and monkey decision making is magnitude sensitive. [Tajima et al., 2019] Tajima, S., Drugowitsch, J., Patel, N., and Pouget, A. (2019) . Optimal policy for 173 multi-alternative decisions. Nature Neuroscience, 22:1503-1511. 174 [Tajima et al., 2016] Tajima, S., Drugowitsch, J., and Pouget, A. (2016) . Optimal policy for value-based . Geometric discounting of reward in trinary decisions -optimal policy with linear utility, discount rate γ = 0.8, value scales ∆v as indicated. Magnitude-sensitive reaction times are a feature of the optimal policy. For full explanation see Fig. 1 in the main text.
Multi-Alternative Decisions: Optimal Policies Appear Magnitude-Insensitive for Selected Nonlinear Utility Under Bayes Risk-Optimisation
Under Bayes Risk-optimisation in trinary decisions it is known that optimal policies are magnitude-insensitive when subjective utility is linear [Tajima et al., 2019] , whereas for binary decisions Bayes Risk-optimisation leads to magnitude-sensitivity when subjective utility is nonlinear [Tajima et al., 2016] . Under reasonable nonlinear subjective utility functions, however, optimal policies for Bayes Risk-optimisation over three options appear magnitude-insensitive (Fig. 3) .
As can be seen from Fig. 3 , the magnitude-insensitive strategy with utility defined according to a hyperbolic tangent function is simple 'max' with no accumulation of evidence. As can be also be seen from Fig. 3 , the magnitude-insensitive strategy with utility defined Figure 3 . Bayes Risk in trinary decisions -optimal policy with nonlinear utilities sign(v) abs(v) and tanh(v), value scales ∆v as indicated. Utility functions indicated do not give rise to magnitude-sensitive reaction-times. For full explanation see Fig. 1 in the main text.
according to a square root function is closer to the 'max-vs-next' strategy observed in [Tajima et al., 2019] .
Multi-Alternative Decisions: Optimal Policies Become Magnitude-Sensitive Again for Nonlinear Utility Under Geometric Discounting
While section 4 showed that selected nonlinear utility functions, unlike the binary decision case, do not lead to magnitude-sensitivity in multi-alternative decisions with Bayes Risk-optimisation, here we show that simply switching from Bayes Risk to geometric discounting of future rewards reintroduces magnitude-sensitivity to the optimal policies for those same utility functions; this is illustrated in Fig. 4 . For both nonlinear utility functions considered, geometric discounting of rewards results in optimal policies very similar to those for Bayes Risk-optimisation (Fig. 2) . Figure 4 . Geometric discounting of reward in trinary decisions -optimal policy with nonlinear utilities sign(v) abs(v) and tanh(v), value scales ∆v as indicated. Unlike the Bayes Risk case, optimal policies give rise to magnitude-sensitive reaction times. For full explanation see Fig. 1 in the main text.
